Resignations, Russia, and reputation: the UK’s defensive readiness in an era of change

They say a week is a long time in British politics. This article has been revamped more times than I can count. First, Defence Secretary John Healey and Armed Forces Minister Al Carns resigned. Then, Prime Minister Keir Starmer resigned, to be replaced by Andy Burnham, who promptly appointed Healey as Chancellor of the Exchequer, all within the space of little over a month. Features are meant to take a step back from the chaos and take the long view – but the chaos is the story.

From the local level to the international, defence is crucial, and far more embedded in our lives than you may initially think. For example, multiple universities, including our very own University of Warwick, have been targeted by cyberattacks, with some on behalf of hostile foreign powers. The cyber thieves were interested in defensive technologies, and Warwick is involved in defence infrastructure, such as by receiving grants from the MoD in areas like cybersecurity, to help young people get jobs in defence. Warwick is also a part of the West Midlands Defence and Security Cluster, the third largest defence hub in the UK.

Defensive readiness is not a ‘nice to have’; it is a necessity

Meanwhile, Russia wages an illegal war in Ukraine, and hybrid warfare against the UK and allies. For example, recent arson attacks against Starmer were linked to Russia. Russia exhibits a pattern of recruiting individuals to commit sabotage operations in NATO countries. This capitalises upon the cost-of-living crisis, and the ‘gig economy’, with perpetrators sometimes not even realising that they were working for Russia. Russian drone incursions have become increasingly frequent, with NATO countries such as Romania and Latvia recently targeted. From the MoD seizing a Russian oil tanker that is part of the Russian shadow fleet, to Russian warships firing warning shots in the English Channel or carrying out a live-fire exercise, Russia’s threat to our national security is not in any way abstract or distant; it is here and now. Defensive readiness is not a ‘nice to have’; it is a necessity.

This is exactly why the defence controversy seized headlines: in today’s uncertain, unstable world, the boundaries between the local, the domestic, and the international, are blurred. Healey’s resignation came as a shock. A previously stalwart Starmer ally, he argued insufficient funds had been allocated to defence, citing delays to the Defence Investment Plan (DIP). Meant to be published in autumn, the DIP was finally published after Starmer announced his resignation. Additionally, the MoD wanted eighteen billion for funding gaps in existing projects, with the government only offering thirteen and a half billion. Shortly after the defence resignations, the Air Chief Marshal warned that the DIP does not include enough funding for the “day-to-day” operations of the army, which may have to be “dial[led] back”.

Starmer’s determination to push through with the DIP suggests that he viewed defence as part of his legacy

Healey’s resignation was the final straw. The Number 10 machine frantically tried to downplay ideas of conflict with the Treasury, and ministers were asked to find cuts to fund defence. Ultimately, the DIP was published on the thirtieth of June. Positively, the plan signals greater recognition of the changing nature of warfare: it invests significantly in automated systems, AI, cybersecurity, and overall pledges two-hundred and ninety-eight billion over the next four years. Starmer’s determination to push through with the DIP suggests that he viewed defence as part of his legacy. Standing firm with Ukraine and supporting NATO and Trident arguably enhanced Starmer’s credibility, making the defence controversy all the more damaging.

Yet might Burnham signal greater stability? Choosing Healey as Chancellor is widely perceived to suggest a realignment towards defence. Indeed, defence shares rose after this decision was announced. However, recent events have highlighted the need for caution. The defence industry struggled with DIP delays, with some companies even shutting down, and many smaller companies struggling to survive during the months-long wait. More broadly, the international press has called the office of the UK Prime Minister a “revolving door.” Given that we have lost six Prime Ministers in the last ten years, this hardly bestows the UK with gravitas on the international stage. Burnham’s cabinet is also still in the early days. In his resignation, Healey argued we need three percent rather than two-point seven percent of GDP on defence by 2030. Yet, the Burnham government is currently signalling that they will stay with the two-point seven percent target.

Crucially, DIP delays have already harmed the UK’s international reputation, and considerable effort will be required to undo the damage. Defence spending has long been weaponised by the Trump administration against NATO allies. While NATO members have indeed been reliant on the US and lagged behind the two percent of GDP target, defence spending in Europe has ramped up since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, particularly in Poland. This line of attack nonetheless continues, with the defence spending controversy coming at a delicate time. The UK spent only two point four percent of GDP on defence last year, with Healey arguing that this is insufficient.

The previous Defence Secretary, Dan Jarvis, also had to meet NATO allies in Belgium without the spending plan in place. Starmer spoke with both President Trump and NATO’s Secretary General, Mark Rutte, shortly after Healey’s resignation, to reassure them of the UK’s commitment to defence. Domestic struggles have complicated international relations at a time of significant global instability. Let us hope that there is less turnover in the MoD.

The UK cannot afford to look weak

The UK cannot afford to look weak, especially when Washington intends to cut back on troops and equipment in Europe, such as fighter jets, drones, and warships. Washington also announced a full-scale review of the presence of US troops in Europe. President Trump undermines the very fabric of NATO’s collective security alliance, for example, by threatening Greenland’s sovereignty. Trump has also quite literally rolled out the red carpet for Putin while sidelining Ukraine and allies in supposed ‘peace’ negotiations. Clearly, the US can no longer be relied upon and is arguably destabilising the security of the UK and our allies. Strategic defence spending is crucial to reduce our dependence on the US.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognise contextual constraints regarding defence spending. Fiscal constraints include Britain’s soaring government debt, which, at the end of May 2026, totalled approximately ninety-five percent of annual GDP. Government U-turns, such as winter fuel payments, left the Treasury with less room to manoeuvre. Over a decade of various economic shocks has placed further strain on public finances. Starmer also made difficult choices to fund defence, such as cutting foreign aid by half. The MoD is historically underfunded: adjusting for inflation, defence spending fell by twenty-two percent 2009-2017 (under the Conservatives, who might be expected to be more hawkish). Another critical issue is how funding is used. In his resignation letter, Carns argued that our defence capabilities are suitable for past wars “while our adversaries arm for the next one.”

Burnham inherits a tricky legacy and must bolster the UK’s defensive readiness before it is too late

However, narratives of Britain’s ungovernability, or a focus on context, cannot come at the cost of responsibility or scrutiny. The state may be buffeted in multiple directions by crises and voters, but the role of government is also to lead. Patterns of indecision and chaos pervaded Starmer’s premiership: from U-turns to the Mandelson saga. The government’s decision in May to water down sanctions on Russian oil and gas in response to rising fuel prices is a clear example of short-termism and failures of prioritisation. That said, Starmer has made contributions to defence, and to Ukraine – for Ukraine’s security is our security. Yet, his politics was largely reactive, rather than active. The recent positive changes in defence policy arguably required the catalyst of resignations. Instability already dominates the international sphere; it cannot continue at home. From the consistent underfunding of the MoD to DIP delays, the UK’s reputation, credibility, and capabilities have already been damaged. Burnham inherits a tricky legacy and must bolster the UK’s defensive readiness before it is too late.