Intervention contention – Avoiding Syria

We’ve been here before. Or rather, we’ve been in several versions of ‘here’ many times over in the last twenty years. Once again, a Middle Eastern war is likely because of fears of a dictator committing further atrocities against his own people. And once again the idea that doing something, however unhelpful that something may be is always better than doing nothing, risks plunging the Middle East and the world’s leading powers into a prolonged and bloody conflict.

One of the most dangerous things world leaders can do in times such as these is jump to conclusions and rush to war before the facts have been established, or consequences and long-term planning have been thought through. Whilst it is most likely that it is indeed the Syrian government that launched the attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, UN weapons inspectors say they need more time to verify this and the wider structure of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile. Does this sound familiar? Because it is exactly what happened in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Also like Iraq, it appears the US, UK, and their allies have no idea how this intervention might end.

This is not to say that intervention is never justified. Genuine humanitarian efforts – such as those in Kosovo and Sierra Leone – can save lives and defend democracy and human rights. Even interventions that bring about regime change – such as the intervention in Libya that toppled Muammar Gaddafi – can be justified if it is clear who the ‘bad guys’ are, and how the intervention might end, and it was clear that the Libyan opposition were in the right and could win with Western help. This situation is much less clear in Syria, and not only because Syria represents a much more formidable military threat.

Rather than a rather more straightforward war where a dictator faces a popular uprising, Syria has descended into a nasty, sectarian civil war where the Assad regime – backed by Russia and Iran – is mostly supported by the Alawite minority sect of which the President is a member and also the Shia branch of Islam. Meanwhile, Sunni Muslims and separatist Kurds are almost to a man and woman opposed to the government. While claims of ‘genocide’ based on these sectarian divisions are premature, this does provide a worrying extra dimension to the conflict.

If the West carries out tactical missile strikes, as is currently being proposed, any attack is likely to inflame tensions between the major powers further

Not only that, but the composition of the opposition is more troubling than it has been in other ‘Arab Spring’ countries. Whilst Libya, Tunisia and Egypt have been troubled by radical Islamic groups, some linked to the fading al-Qaeda, their transitions to democracy have mostly been a struggle (sadly and violently, in the latter’s case) between secular liberalism and conservative (i.e. often unpleasant and backward, but not revolutionary or terrorist-linked) Islamism.

A large proportion of the Syrian opposition’s fighting force is either radical forces like al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or funded by such. This further weakens the moderate elements of the opposition, who face losing support to radicals who can get hold of weapons and resources. This is not to say, of course, that the West should arm the rebels; as the war is unwinnable for either side that would merely prolong the conflict and cause more bloodshed. Humanitarian and financial support for those in the opposition who would like to see a country moulded like ours should be the course of action.

Given that there is no guarantee that the Assad regime would be deterred from further use of chemical weapons if the West carries out tactical missile strikes, as is currently being proposed, any attack is likely to inflame tensions between the major powers further, given Russia and China’s weariness of Western intervention. The pair’s acquiescence on the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, which they interpreted as being very narrow, led to regime change, the measure is unlikely to gain the support needed to become legal under international law.

After Iraq, the US and UK should know that interventions without formal approval are both fraught with danger and erode their moral authority, already in tatters after twelve years of a self-defeating ‘War on Terror’. What is the point in having international law, where would be the justification in delivering Assad to the International Criminal Court to be held accountable, if the major powers ignore their own rules and attack whomever they please?

Genuine humanitarian efforts – such as those in Kosovo and Sierra Leone – can save lives and defend … human rights.

Two years of murky, morally ambiguous civil war has produced a bitter stalemate, and it is clear the only way to peace in Syria is a negotiated settlement involving all parties, religious sects, regions and most importantly the outside powers with stakes in the conflict. Russia and its allies are already wary of the West’s interventionism, and attacking Syria, perhaps illegally, as a way of ‘enforcing’ chemical weapons conventions, will put off the day when all parties get around the negotiating table by months, possibly years, costing thousands more lives in the process. International relations are about trust. Open-ended military action, with no clear long-term strategy, is likely to eradicate what remains of the trust between the key players in this most complex of proxy wars.

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Header image courtesy of flickr.com/FreedomHouse

Comments (1)

  • Firstly, the UN team that took samples and conducted
    interviews in Ghouta the other week will not ‘verify’ that the Syrian
    government launched the attack. They do not have a mandate to assign
    responsibility for the attack, they were there to gather evidence of chemical
    weapon use and hopefully to shed light on what substance was used.

    Your suggestion that ‘Sunni Muslims are almost to a man and
    woman opposed to the government’ is laughable. Three-quarters of Syria’s
    population is Sunni and hundreds of thousands of enlisted men and officers in
    the SAA are Sunni. Even the unquestionably Alawite-dominated Syrian air force
    is only slightly less than half Sunni with many of those serving as pilots. If the
    Sunni population united against Assad there would be no civil war in Syria.

    ‘Their [Libya, Tunisia and Egypt] transitions to democracy
    have mostly been a struggle between secular liberalism and conservative
    Islamism’ – this misconception gets trotted out time and time again. Yes, the
    well-educated, affluent, English-speaking and Westernised commentators from the Arab world do sometimes like to portray the Arab uprisings as a binary
    struggle for democracy but these views are not representative of
    the grassroots movements that overthrew the old regimes. Take a look at the banners on display at Tahrir in 2011 and 2013 – find one about democracy. The bread and butter of the ‘Arab Spring’ is exactly that – bread, oil and jobs.

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