New defence chief has different battle on hands

**It’s funny how events come together. The week General Sir Nicholas Houghton was appointed the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the professional head of Britain’s armed forces, is the same that we reflect on 10 years since the ill fated invasion of Iraq and read reports of the British Army drawing down after a less than successful period in Afghanistan.**

With the Strategic Defence and Security Review cutting the Army to its lowest numbers since the Boer War, this is an in-tray that most would balk at.

To make matters worse, despite receiving unparalleled support from the public, as possibly the last respected public institution, the army is approaching a new era and is uncertain of its role. Liberal intervention policies have been discredited and politicians are now likely to prefer a hands off approach delivered by the RAF or Royal Navy; military power conducted at arms length, rather than the politically dangerous boots on the ground delivered by the army.

{{ quote Gone are the days where entire armies marched upon each other: the interconnectedness of economies due to globalisation has thankfully put a stop to that }}

But, as is so often true, in the period of greatest uncertainty, lies the greatest opportunity. The new Chief of Defence Staff has the ability to take a good hard look at the army and remodel it from one uncomfortably geared to fight wars from 30 years ago, to one ready to protect British interests for the coming decades.

Gone are the days where entire armies marched upon each other: the interconnectedness of economies due to globalisation has thankfully put a stop to that. Short, sharp deployments in failed states are going to continue à la Libya or Mali. These require a flexible, forward thinking army; not easy for an organisation rightly proud of traditions etched from its 300 year history.

How can the new CDS do this? Firstly, change like this must be driven from the top and the first place Gen. Houghton can look at is the number of senior officers sitting around the table. Frank Ledwidge, in his highly recommended book _Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan_, notes that Britain’s armed forces may of a similar size as the US Marine Corps but we still have eight times the number one star and higher officers (Brigadier and above).

The British army is top heavy and with cuts hitting the bottom, this is finally the opportunity to design a top for a 112,000 man army, not for the over 200,000 the top brass is geared to commanding.

The high readiness reaction force developed in _Army2020_ is a welcomed development and will allow British Armed forces to respond to events as they happen, but it needs to be accompanied by similar developments elsewhere. Past campaigns have shown that military victory often rests not on military operations but the ability of the local government to operate effectively. The Department for International Development and the Foreign Office, must also be encouraged to create a rapid reaction division to embed with the host country and deploy as a partner to the army to ensure that any military gains made are sustainable once the force leaves.

{{ quote The CDS must encourage scholar soldiers like the US, where it is not uncommon for majors to have Masters degrees and generals to take time out to reflect on their career and the assumptions underlying military operations while studying for a PhD }}

Finally, the British Army must look at its knowledge pool, which is too often restricted by past glorious battles. While the lessons learnt from previous operations are vital for the present and the future, they must not be allowed to be transformed into legends. The British Army was indeed successful at battling insurgents in Malaya and learnt how to fight amongst the people in a contemporary setting in Northern Ireland, but it failed to adapt these lessons successfully in Iraq.

The CDS must encourage scholar soldiers like the US, where it is not uncommon for majors to have Master’s degrees and generals to take time out to reflect on their career and the assumptions underlying military operations while studying for a PhD. The aim of this? To encourage healthy debate before operations, promote innovation from the field, and allow those who conduct the tactical war to consider its strategic effect.

Britain’s new CDS has the opportunity to complete the modernisation that should have happened after the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Let us hope he embraces this monumental task.

As a final point, it is worth noting that the Royal Navy has not had an officer in the top two positions in the British armed forces for over a decade. Is this a sign that its influence may be started to wane, or that it is no longer to produce officers able to reach for the very top? Either way the Royal Navy must be concerned.