Likely bedfellows: Why closer UK-China ties are no surprise at all

The rekindling of historic diplomatic and trade relations between the UK and China is just the beginning of a process of reconciliation, and the herald of a future that will likely be dominated by Chinese influence. Soon, in Beijing, economic talks between the UK and China will be held for the first time in seven years, with the enormous expansion of trade relations as the central focus of both parties’ agendas. The talks are to prioritise increasing exports from Britain to China, targeting a wide range of industries such as automobiles, medicine, alcohol, food, education, and sports.

The enormous benefits to the UK cannot be denied. Already, UK businesses, with government support, have been able to secure £2 billion in additional exports to China last year, and that number is now expected to further increase by over £1 billion, courtesy of renewed negotiations. To build on this success, in March 2025, the largest British civic delegation in history arrived in Chongqing, China, where further deals within the technology and energy sectors were made as a result. While Chinese-owned vital infrastructure is nothing new in the UK, nor anywhere else worldwide, the welcoming of Chinese mobile phone technology into the country is a complete U-turn on previous scepticism surrounding Chinese mobile provider Huawei.

The question to ask instead is how far the UK is willing to tie itself to China, and how much of the aforementioned shady behaviour will the UK tolerate

In many ways, it is hardly surprising that China should suddenly find itself in a more favourable position in the negotiation of international trade deals, particularly with European countries. The election of US President Donald Trump, and his subsequent policy of sweeping global tariffs, along with his expansionist rhetoric and transaction-based diplomacy, has foreshadowed an America that is highly unpredictable and significantly less diplomatic. Is it any surprise, then, that many of the US’ previous trading partners should then turn to the second-largest economy in the world? An economy that, though embroiled in shady behaviour, is at the very least predictable and reliable.

The question to ask instead is how far the UK is willing to tie itself to China, and how much of the aforementioned shady behaviour will the UK tolerate? The dropping of the case against two suspected Chinese spies suggests a fair amount. On March 13 2023, Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry were both arrested under the Official Secrets Act, and were later charged with espionage offences on April 22 2024. The pair were accused of providing information to China, contrary to the interests of the state. Even though such concerns were raised, Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry had all charges against them dropped by prosecutors on September 15 2025, with the Crown Prosecution Service citing a lack of evidence to go to trial.

While the Labour government denied any involvement and communicated their frustration at the collapse of the trial, they faced accusations from the Tories that Jonathan Powell, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, had intervened. Labour and the Conservatives accused each other of sympathies and fondness for China, and alleged a refusal to label it as a national security threat. Witness statements from the Deputy National Security Adviser, Matthew Collins, firmly label China as “a threat to our people, prosperity, and security”. He describes the “active espionage threat” that China poses.

Where the UK government has asserted itself against China in the past, such as the banning of Huawei equipment from the 5G network in December 2020, such precedents cannot be relied upon further

Despite his strong condemnations, Collins goes on to mention that “it is important for me to emphasise … that the government is committed to pursuing a positive economic relationship with China.” Combined with accusations that the word “enemy” had been deliberately removed from Collins’ account, the resulting picture is one of uncertainty and distrust, with the possibility of government intervention still open. Regardless of the innocence or guilt of the two accused, the fact remains that the government has in its possession the results of an investigation that states in no uncertain terms the dangers posed by Beijing and its repeated attempts at espionage, in both digital and more old-fashioned methods.

The government’s lack of direct action can perhaps be explained by Chancellor Rachel Reeves defending her attendance at the first UK-China economic summit since 2019, held in Beijing in January: “Choosing not to engage with China is no choice at all”. It would seem that, when dealing with the single largest export economy in the world (with total 2024 exports valued at $3.58 trillion, accounting for 14.6% of global exports the same year), there is no choice but to shake hands and make up.

In the past, the UK has been able to keep China at arm’s length due to the support of its other powerful trading partners, namely the US. With this crutch compromised and uncertain, the source of economic growth for the UK and its businesses has migrated eastwards, towards a China that is growing more central to the global economy every day. Despite the known threats posed by China in the form of cyberattacks, espionage, and human rights violations – chiefly the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, described by the Foreign Secretary in 2021 as “one of the worst human rights crises of our time” – none of this is enough to rule out China as a prominent trading partner.

Where the UK government has asserted itself against China in the past, such as the banning of Huawei equipment from the 5G network in December 2020, such precedents cannot be relied upon further. Where previously security risks were actively or reactively prevented, now they must be tolerated. It is clear that the government has chosen to cautiously court China to further national interests, but the precise degree of this caution is yet to be seen. Political opponents, namely Kemi Badenoch of the Conservative Party, have wasted no time in condemning the case of the two Christophers as an example of a lack of strategy on the part of the Labour government. She called Prime Minister Keir Starmer “too weak to stand up to Beijing on a crucial matter of national security”.

It remains to be seen precisely where Labour will draw a line in its new friendship with Beijing, but if the events of this year are to be any indication, that line is a long way off; it may practically be a dot at this juncture. The centrality of the Chinese market to Labour’s plans for British economic growth is evident, and it appears we must all make some sacrifices in exchange. Perhaps, as one example, the 5G network in this country will find itself open to Huawei once more.