The free vote for Syria – defeat or victory for Corbyn?

[dropcap]T[/dropcap]he recent parliamentary debate on Syrian intervention was obscured by the ongoing crises within the Labour party. The vote marked a decisive encounter for Jeremy Corbyn and was a critical risk to his already embattled leadership. That he survived, and emerged from the ordeal emboldened, is remarkable.

Corbyn managed to stave off a coup, albeit at the cost of sustaining a sizeable rebellion from his enemies, by permitting Labour members a ‘free vote’ on Syria. Corbyn wisely retracted his statement on 19^th November which committed to adopting an official policy position “as a party” not to intervene in Syria.

Corbyn managed to stave off a coup, albeit at the cost of sustaining a sizeable rebellion from his enemies

This bore all the hallmarks of an unreceptive leader unwilling to appreciate their viewpoint. John McDonnell, the Shadow Chancellor, redirected intentions towards “a free vote on the basis of conscience”. This calmed Corbyn’s critics, who share a chronic distrust of him, from gaining an excuse to evolve into a more menacing presence.

The issue is not to consider whether a ‘free vote’ was the right course of action, but to recognise it as the only viable decision to make. This distinction is demonstrated in the battles between Labour’s main factions. ‘Progress’ press for military intervention to emphasise the need for a tangible and ‘active’ defence policy, whereas ‘Momentum’ favour a spotless ideological purity within the party, and remain untroubled by defeats providing the party moves in the ‘right’ direction.

The issue is not to consider whether a ‘free vote’ was the right course of action, but to recognise it as the only viable decision to make

A “New Politics” has previously been touted by Corbyn and has provided a useful way of solidifying his position from critics, whether it’s perceived as a conscious design or a convenient veneer. His “New Politics” became a rallying point of caution and scepticism about foreign adventurism shared between various unrelated views and united them.

Non-interventionism gained a crucial outlet, and opposition to Syrian airstrikes was a touchstone for the popular support which has informed Labour’s foreign policy outlook since Iraq. Corbyn unleashed and gave expression to these sentiments.

John McDonnell’s call to “unite around the principles of the new politics” has a deeper meaning to it – in this case, to commit voting on war as a matter of conscience rather than party loyalty. Corbyn should have offered a free vote from the beginning as decisions concerning war cannot be governed by a neat, self-contained ideology; or reduce the ideological niceties and caveats of each member to a matter of party loyalty.

John McDonnell’s call to “unite around the principles of the new politics” has a deeper meaning to it – in this case, to commit voting on war as a matter of conscience rather than party loyalty

Corbyn’s specific mission against a “reckless, half-baked intervention” may be validated. The issue of intervention is broader than the effectiveness of bombing, and cannot be driven by an idealism which envisions Syria becoming a secular, multicultural, and liberal democracy untroubled by ethnic or religious cleavages. That is either pure delusion, or wilful ignorance of the realities of Syria.

Corbyn’s outdated views, an allusion to his membership of the dubious ‘Stop the War Coalition’, and supposed limitations were conflated with his opposition to war and taken to justify intervention as a rational move. Criticisms of Corbyn have ranged from his treatment as a principled but misguided figure, to a venomous portrayal of a twisted influence in British politics.

Yet Corbyn and Tom Watson compiled reasonable prior conditions to war. Namely: unambiguous United Nations approval, the support of regional partners and a comprehensive humanitarian plan. Corbyn lambasted a “bomb now, talk later” approach which ignores the complexity of the issues and forces at play.

Criticisms of Corbyn have ranged from his treatment as a principled but misguided figure, to a venomous portrayal of a twisted influence in British politics

His cautious, questioning strategy is a prudent one which illuminates the root issues that nobody wants to, but must, address. These include: Saudi funding of ISIS and the broader divide between Sunni and Shia in the Islamic world; Russia’s solely pro-Assad agenda weakening the international ‘coalition’; Turkish nationalism against the Kurds; the unknown ‘moderate’ fighters; the Kurdish Peshmerga’s aim to only defend Kurdistan and not assume a larger role; and the knowledge that the West are unwilling to make a meaningful commitment undermines regional trust.

Opposition to war is not morally unproblematic, as doing nothing is also a choice which carries consequences, and defeating ISIS without military intervention is a fallacy. Yet Corbyn passed three critical ordeals. He reaffirmed party confidence as most cabinet members voted with him, demonstrated electoral clout with victory in the coinciding Oldham by-election, and established personal competence which may yet be further validated.

Corbyn’s stance has qualified assumptions about the efficacy of intervention, pacified and soothed his detractors, and further embedded his position within the Labour party. His tactical mastery and the nuance of his “New Politics” won him the argument but lost him the debate.