Iran’s atomic plans are becoming an explosive issue

In an interview with The Atlantic, Benjamin Netanyahu asserted the following: “The Obama presidency has two great missions: fixing the economy, and preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.” This month, with the former goal seemingly stalling, it is the latter that has been brought into sharp focus.

The Iranian regime, the West’s bête noire since the 1979 coup, has long denied that its civil nuclear programme is being adapted for more sinister purposes. But, with a new report from the International Atomic Energy Agency, have we finally uncovered a smoking gun – or, in this case, smoking calutron?

On November 8, the IAEA published its latest report on Iran’s nuclear programme, expressing “concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” The organization claims it has accumulated information indicating that Iran has engaged in activities “relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device”. This ranges from efforts to procure nuclear related materials, to work on weapons development and testing.

Sensitive to possible comparisons with the flawed intelligence preceding the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the report dedicates a section to ‘credibility of information’, claiming a greater weight of national and independent sources.

For the mainstream press, this seemed to amount to groundbreaking evidence; The New York Times subsequently led with the story, quoting an anonymous Western diplomat who characterised the report as “describ[ing] virtually all the steps to make a nuclear warhead and the progress Iran has achieved in each”.

Look beyond the the hype, however, and the report does not give any indication that Iran is in the process of building a nuclear warhead. It admits that all Iran’s low-enriched uranium is accounted for – international inspectors continue “to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at [Iran’s] nuclear facilities”, with the help of on-site camera facilities. Furthermore, the basic claims made in the report have been dismissed by retired IAEA director Robert Kelley as “very old news”. So if no concrete proof exists of armament, and very little new information has been uncovered, why are the media, and indeed officials in Washington and Tel Aviv, ramping up the rhetoric?

The possible explanations are numerous, but the one that is particularly insightful comes courtesy of a Wikileaked Embassy cable, regarding a change of leadership at the Agency. In July 2009, former UN diplomat Yukiya Amano succeeded Mohammed ElBaradei as the IAEA’s Director General. While the latter had been critical of Washington’s handling of Iran’s nuclear programme in the past, Amano was seen by US mandarins as being “ready for prime time” – hence, “solidly in [line with} the U.S…on every strategic decision”, including alleged Iranian weapon development. Perhaps it is simply inevitable then that the Agency’s evidence, however dog-eared and circumstantial, has been presented in a form sufficiently ‘sexed-up’ for the Washington hawks.

So where is Britain in all of this? Despite having some rather unexpected similarities (Britain and Iran are the only two states where religious leaders sit in the national legislature), relations with the Ahmadinejad regime have deteriorated further.

Last Sunday, the Iranian parliament voted unanimously to downgrade diplomatic ties with Britain for the first time in 13 years. This decision came less than a week after the Treasury, in response to the IAEA report, tightened sanctions on Iranian banks. Chants of ‘Death to England’ reverberated around the chamber, and were echoed by students who stormed the British Embassy in Tehran, regarded as the mission most hostile to the regime, in the absence of American or Israeli presence. The government is playing a dangerous game; worsening Iran’s predicament could further deepen the resolve of the regime’s most extreme elements.

Of course, a nuclear Iran is a dangerous and worrying prospect. However, the United States is in danger of repeating the mistake it made in Iraq, namely, letting anxieties about the public perception of a brutal regime cloud their judgements about the state’s military intentions and capabilities. In addition, Washington must also consider the impact of its mixed geopolitical messages.

The decision to invade non-nuclear Iraq, while simultaneously attempting to deal with nuclear North Korea through diplomatic channels, has already stretched the credibility of the US and its allies. How much further can it be stretched? Despite the heavy-handed bluster deployed in Tel Aviv, and indeed behind Republican debate lecterns, Obama must hold firm, dial down his rhetoric and not be swayed by a report that is rehashed, reheated, and ultimately unconvincing.