The end of the road for dangerous drivers

Last week outraged posts filled up news websites, as it emerged that a motorist who sent more than twenty text messages before crashing into a stationary car and killing its driver, was jailed for just twenty-one months. The posts in question were universally condemnatory, commenting on the leniency of the sentence, with many expressing the view that the length of sentence should reflect the loss of life. Yet when I delved into past records to find any precedents set by similar cases of dangerous driving, I found that ostensibly short sentences seemed to be the norm.

In 2001, a drink-driver who killed a pregnant woman in a hit-and-run crash was jailed for five years. Andrew Drummond was over twice the legal limit when he hit a scooter on the M20 and drove home in a panic, before calling 999. Ms Long’s boyfriend, Alan Russ, commented on the sentence, “I would have wanted for him to get life for what he did. He did not take one life but he took two.” Others walk away with even shorter sentences. In 2008, Adam Harazim, was jailed for three years and four months after pleading guilty to causing the death of Samantha Forrest, 16, by driving inebriated.

Some of these seeming discrepancies in severity of convictions lie in the minutiae of the way the law is dictated. The definitions used to describe quality of driving are worryingly imprecise. Careless driving is defined to be ‘when you drive at a standard that falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver.’ Dangerous driving is defined to be almost identical, with the additional clause, ‘falls far below.’ The maximum penalty for death by dangerous driving, however, stands at fourteen years, whilst the penalty for death by careless driving carries a maximum of just five years. Anti-drink-driving activists have claimed that the ambiguity in the two definitions leads to offenders receiving more lenient sentences than they deserve.

I do have to question the unequivocal condemnation expressed by certain members of the public at these relatively short sentences. Certainly some of these offenders’ actions were utterly irresponsible and despicable. Yet others were caused by a simple lapse in judgement, which many of us can relate to. Most motorists admit to breaking the laws of the road, confessing to speeding, using a mobile whilst driving, and drink-driving. In a government survey one in eight drivers admitted to driving in the knowledge that they were over the limit. The argument for the correct sentence for causing death by dangerous driving is a problematic one, as any assessment must reconcile the extreme repercussions of the offence with wildly varying levels of driver culpability.

I am inclined to argue against these outraged cries for longer or life sentences, and favour the polemical argument that the punishments for dangerous driving should depend on the intent of the driver and the quality of the driving, with a much lesser focus on the consequences. This is not as controversial an argument as it might seem; current governmental guidelines recommend taking the culpability of the offender as the main factor in sentencing, and the consequences of the offence as a minor factor. The argument for this is based upon the premise that the potential consequences of dangerous driving range hugely, and are often down to chance, rather than malicious intent. Imagine that two drivers, with the same amount of alcohol in their system, the same intent, and all other factors equal, both veer wildly off a street in their state of intoxication. One driver hits a lamp-post; the other hits a pedestrian and kills them. These two drivers have committed a similar offence, with tragically different consequences. Many would argue that this consequence has to be taken into account because justice must be achieved in a way that does not make a mockery out of the loss of life. The fact is, however, that our idea of justice is totally abstract; there is no sentence that can atone for the loss of a loved one, nor does it take the forced deterioration of another life to validate the worth of the life that was lost.

Despite the natural instinct to reach out in sympathy with the family of the victim, the sentence imposed upon the offender must be for the good of society rather than the victim; it must be a preventative action and deterrent, but not a form of revenge or an abstract attempt to dole out a justice which can never be achieved. What strikes me as a major discrepancy is that, although the maximum penalty for causing death by dangerous driving is fourteen years, an extremely dangerous driver who is lucky enough to not cause death, cannot be sentenced to more than six months. Every drink driver is a potential killer, and the penalties should reflect that. Instead of condemning the few whose drink driving has resulted in death to a life sentence, why not severely penalise all who choose to get behind the wheel whilst over the limit, in the knowledge that they risk the lives of others? Meaningful penalties and bans, depending on the severity of the infringement, need to be given out for all drink driving offences as well as other offences such as use of mobile phones, in order to act as an actual deterrent. Perhaps this sounds overly authoritarian, but it must be remembered that driving is not a human right; it is a skilled activity, and when abused, a weapon.

Of course the loss of a life is hugely significant and the impact on a victim’s loved ones cannot be underestimated. Public sentiment declares that the law has some moral obligation to fulfil the desire to see punishment reflecting loss of life, but then we come dangerously close to the ‘eye for an eye’ mentality which, as the saying goes, merely leaves the whole world blind.